We study the robustness of interim correlated rationalizability to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We introduce a new metric topology on the universal type space, called uniform weak topology, under which two types are close if they have similar first-order beliefs, attach similar probabilities to other players having similar first-order beliefs, and so on, where the degree of similarity is uniform over the levels of the belief hierarchy. This topology generalizes the now classic notion of proximity to common knowledge based on common p-beliefs (Monderer and Samet (1989) ). We show that convergence in the uniform weak topology implies convergence in the uniform strategic topology (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006)). Moreover, when the limit is a finite type, uniform-weak convergence is also a necessary condition for convergence in the strategic topology. Finally, we show that the set of finite types is nowhere dense under the uniform strategic topology. Thus, our results shed light on the connection between similarity of beliefs and similarity of behaviors in games.
Introduction.
The Bayesian analysis of incomplete information games requires the specification of a type space, which is a representation of the players' uncertainty about fundamentals, their uncertainty about the other players' uncertainty about fundamentals, and so on, ad infinitum.
Thus the strategic outcomes of a Bayesian game may depend on entire infinite hierarchies of beliefs. Critically, in some games this dependence can be very sensitive at the tails of the hierarchies, so that a mispecification of higher-order beliefs, even at arbitrarily high orders, can have a large impact on the predictions of strategic behavior, as shown by the Electronic Mail game of Rubinstein (1989) . As a matter of fact, this phenomenon is not special to the E-mail game. Recently, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) have shown that in any game satisfying a certain payoff richness condition, if a player has multiple actions that are consistent with interim correlated rationalizability-the solution concept that embodies common knowledge of rationality-then any of these actions can be made uniquely rationalizable by suitably perturbing the player's higher-order beliefs at any arbitrarily high order. This phenomenon raises a conceptual issue: if predictions of strategic behavior are not robust to mispecification of higher-order beliefs, then the common practice in applied analysis of modeling uncertainty using small type spaces-often finite-may give rise to spurious predictions.
A natural approach to study this robustness problem is topological. Consider the correspondence that maps each type of a player into his set of interim correlated rationalizable (ICR) actions. The fragility of strategic behavior identified by Rubinstein (1989) and Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) can be recast as a certain kind of discontinuity of the ICR correspondence in the product topology over hierarchies of beliefs, i.e. the topology of weak convergence of k-order beliefs, for each k ≥ 1. While in every game the ICR correspondence is upper hemi-continuous in the product topology, lower hemi-continuity can fail even for the strict ICR correspondence-a refinement of ICR that requires the incentive constraints to hold with strict inequality.
1 Strictness rules out incentives that hinge on a "knife-edge," which can always be destroyed by suitably perturbing the payoffs of the game. Indeed, non-strict solution concepts are known to fail lower hemi-continuity in other contexts: e.g., in complete information games, Nash equilibrium, and, in fact, even best-reply correspondences fail to be lower hemi-continuous with respect to payoff perturbations. On the other hand, the strict Nash equilibrium and the strict best-reply correspondences are lower hemicontinuous. It is therefore surprising that this form of continuity breaks down when it comes to perturbations of higher-order beliefs.
1 Here, the notion of strictness is actually quite strong: the slack in the incentive constraints is required to be bounded away from zero uniformly on a best reply set. Despite this, the strict ICR correspondence fails to be lower hemi-continuous in the product topology.
There exist, of course, finer topologies under which the ICR correspondence is upper hemi-continuous and the strict ICR correspondence is lower hemi-continuous in all games.
The coarsest such topology is the strategic topology introduced by Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) ; it embodies the minimum restrictions on the class of admissible perturbations of higher-order beliefs necessary to render rationalizable behavior continuous. Thus the strategic topology gives a tight measure of the robustness of strategic behavior: if the analyst considers any larger set of perturbations he is bound to make a non-robust prediction in some game. Given this significance, we believe the strategic topology deserves closer examination. Indeed, Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) only define it implicitly in terms of proximity of behavior in games, as opposed to explicitly using some notion of proximity of probability measures. This leaves open the important question as to what proximity in the strategic topology means in terms of the beliefs of the players.
To address this question we introduce a new metric topology on types, called uniform weak topology, under which a sequence of types (t n ) n≥1 converges to a type t if the k-order belief of t n weakly converges to that of t and the rate of convergence is uniform over k ≥ 1.
More precisely, for each k ≥ 1 we consider the Prohorov metric, d k , over k-order beliefs-a standard metric that metrizes the topology of weak convergence of probability measuresand then define the uniform weak topology as the topology of convergence in the metric
Our first main result, Theorem 1, is that convergence in the uniform weak topology implies convergence in the uniform strategic topology. The latter, also introduced by Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) , is the coarsest topology on types under which the ICR correspondence is upper hemi-continuous and the strict ICR correspondence is lower hemi-continuous, where the continuity is now required to hold uniformly across all games. 2 In particular, Theorem 1 implies that convergence in the uniform weak topology is a sufficient condition for convergence in the strategic topology.
To put Theorem 1 in perspective, a comparison with a well known result of Monderer and Samet (1989) will prove useful. This early paper studies the robustness of Nash equilibrium to small amounts of incomplete information, defining proximity to complete information via the notion of common belief. Given a payoff-relevant parameter θ, say that a type of a player has common p-belief in θ if he assigns probability no smaller than p to θ, assigns probability no smaller than p to the event that θ obtains and the other players assign probability no smaller than p to θ, and so forth, ad infinitum. A sequence of types (t n ) n≥1 has asymptotic common certainty of θ if for every p < 1, t n has common p-belief in θ for all n large enough. Although the focus of Monderer and Samet (1989) is on the ex ante robustness of Nash equilibrium under common prior perturbations, their main result has the following counterpart in our interim, non-common prior, non-equilibrium framework:
limit to our analysis, finite type spaces play a prominent role both in applied and theoretical work, so it is important to know that our sufficient condition for strategic convergence is also necessary in this case.
Finite types are also the focus of our third main result, Theorem 3. We show that, under the uniform-strategic topology, the set of finite types is nowhere dense, i.e. its closure has an empty interior. To understand the conceptual implications of this result, recall that Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) have demonstrated the denseness of finite types under the non-uniform version of the strategic topology. 7 Arguably, this result provides a compelling justification for why it might be without loss of generality to model uncertainty restricting attention to finite type spaces: Irrespective of how large the "true" type space T is, for any given game there is always a finite type space T with the property that the predictions of strategic behavior based on T are arbitrarily close to those based on T . Our nowhere denseness result thus implies that such finite type space T cannot be chosen independently of the game. This is particularly relevant for environments such as those of mechanism design, where the game-both payoffs and action sets-is not a priori fixed.
More generally, our result implies that the uniform strategic topology is strictly finer than the strategic topology. Thus, while a priori these two notions of strategic continuity seem equally compelling, assuming one or the other can have a large impact on the ensuing theory.
The exercise in this paper is similar in spirit to that of Monderer and Samet (1996) and Kajii and Morris (1998) , who, like us, consider perturbations of incomplete information games. These papers provide belief-based characterizations of strategic topologies for Bayesian Nash equilibrium in countable partition models à la Aumann (1976). However, since both of these papers assume a common prior and adopt an ex ante approach, while we adopt an interim approach without imposing a common prior, it is difficult to establish a precise connection. 8 Another important difference between their approach and ours is in the distinct payoff relevance constraints adopted: we fix the set of payoff-relevant states, so our games cannot have payoffs depending directly on players' higher-order beliefs; Monderer and Samet (1996) and Kajii and Morris (1998) have no such payoff relevance constraint.
The connection between uniform and strategic topologies first appears in Morris (2002) , who studies a special class of games, called higher-order expectation games (HOE), and 7 Mertens and Zamir (1985) prove the denseness of finite types under the product topology. Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) argue that this result does not provide a sound justification for restricting attention to finite types, for strategic behavior is not continuous in the product topology. 8 Monderer and Samet (1996) fix the common prior and consider proximity of information partitions, whereas Kajii and Morris (1998) vary the common prior on a fixed information structure. For this reason, it is already unclear what the precise connection between these papers is.
shows that the topology of uniform convergence of higher-order iterated expectations is equivalent to the coarsest topology under which a certain notion of strict ICR correspondencedifferent from the one we consider-is lower hemi-continuous in every game of the HOE class. 9 Compared to the uniform weak topology, the topology of uniform convergence of iterated expectations is neither finer nor coarser, even around finite types. We further elaborate on this relationship in section 3.3.
This paper is also related to contemporaneous work by Ely and Peski (2008) . Following their terminology, a type t is critical if, under the product topology, the strict ICR correspondence is discontinuous at t in some game. Ely and Peski (2008) provide an insightful characterization of critical types in terms of a common belief property: a type is critical if and only if, for some p > 0, it has common p-belief in some closed (in product topology) proper subset of the universal type space. 10 Conceptually, this result shows that the usual type spaces that appear in applications consist almost entirely of critical types, as these type spaces typically embody nontrivial common belief assumptions. For instance, all finite types are critical and so are almost all types belonging to a common prior type space. Thus Ely and Peski's (2008) result tells us when-based on the common beliefs of the players-there will be some game and some product-convergent sequence along which strategic behavior is discontinuous, whereas we identify a condition for an arbitrary sequence to display continuous strategic behavior in all games.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the standard model of hierarchies of beliefs and type spaces and reviews the solution concept of ICR. Section 3 reviews the strategic and uniform-strategic topologies of Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) , introduces the uniform-weak topology and presents our two main results concerning the relationship between these topologies (Theorems 1 and 2) along with a discussion. Section 4 examines the non-genericity of finite types under the uniform-strategic and uniform-weak topologies, presenting the nowhere denseness result (Theorem 3).
9 Morris (2002) defines his strategic topology for HOE games using a distance that makes no reference to ICR.
But, as we claimed above, it can be shown that his strategic topology coincides with the coarsest topology under which a certain notion of strict ICR correspondence is continuous in every HOE game. The notion of strictness implicit in Morris's (2002) analysis, unlike ours, does not require the slack in the incentive constraints to be uniform. 10 Moreover, they show that under the product topology the regular types, i.e. those types which are not critical, form a residual subset of the universal type space -a standard topological notion of "generic" set.
Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, we fix a two-player set I and a finite set Θ of payoff-relevant states with at least two elements. 11 Given a player i ∈ I, we write −i to designate the other player in I. All topological spaces, when viewed as measurable spaces, are endowed with their
Borel σ -algebra. For a topological space S we write ∆(S) to designate the space of probability measures over S equipped with the topology of weak convergence. Unless explicitly noted, all product spaces are endowed with the product topology and subspaces with the relative topology.
Hierarchies of beliefs and types
Our formulation of incomplete information follows Mertens and Zamir (1985) . 12 Define
, and for each k ≥ 2 define recursively
By virtue of the above coherency condition on marginal distributions, each element of X k is determined by its first and last coordinates, so we can identify
The space T i of hierarchies of beliefs of player i is
Since Θ is finite, T i is a compact metrizable space. Moreover, there is a unique mapping
where π k i is the natural projection of T i onto T k i . Furthermore, the mapping µ i is a homeomorphism, and so, to save on notation, we will identify each hierarchy of belief t i ∈ T i with its corresponding belief µ i (t i ) over Θ × T −i . Similarly, for each t i ∈ T i we will write
Hierarchies of beliefs can be implicitly represented using a type space, i.e. a tuple (T i , φ i ) i∈I where each T i is a Polish space of types and each φ i : T i → ∆(Θ × T −i ) is a 11 We restrict attention to two-player games with finitely many payoff-relevant states for ease of notation. Our results remain valid with any finite number of players and Θ a compact metric space.
12 An alternative, equivalent formulation is found in Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) . measurable function. Indeed, every type t i ∈ T i is mapped into a hierarchy of beliefs 
for all i ∈ I and t i ∈ T i can be viewed as a non-redundant type space.
Bayesian games and interim correlated rationalizability
A game is a tuple G = (A i , g i ) i∈I , where A i is a finite set of actions for player i and g i :
is his payoff function, with M > 0 an arbitrary bound on payoffs that we fix throughout. 14 We write G to denote the set of all games, and for each integer m ≥ 1 we write G m for the set of games with
The solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, or ICR, was introduced in Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007) . Given a γ ∈ R, a type space (T i , φ i ) i∈I and a game G, for each player i ∈ I, integer k ≥ 0 and type t i ∈ T i , we let R k i (t i , G, γ) ⊆ A i designate the set of k-order γ-rationalizable actions of t i . These sets are defined as follows:
and recursively for each integer k ≥ 1, R k i (t i , G, γ) is the set of all actions a i ∈ A i for which there is a conjecture, i.e. a measurable function σ −i :
and for all a i ∈ A i ,
13 To say that ν i is belief-preserving means that µ i (ν i (t i 
14 We will also denote by g i the payoff function in the mixed extension of G, writing g i (α i , α −i , θ) with the obvious meaning for any α i ∈ ∆(A i ) and α −i ∈ ∆(A −i ).
For future reference, a conjecture σ −i : Θ×T −i → ∆(A −i ) satisfying the former condition will be called a (k − 1)-order γ-rationalizable conjecture for type t i . The set of γ-rationalizable actions of type t i is then defined as
Finally, following Ely and Peski (2008) , an action a i ∈ A i is strictly interim correlated γ-rationalizable for type t i , and we write a i ∈
As shown in Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007) 
has the γ-best reply property if for each i ∈ I and t i ∈ T i , each action
If (ς i ) i∈I has the γ-best reply property then ς i (t i ) ⊆ R i (t i , G, γ) for all i ∈ I and t i ∈ T i . As shown in Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007) , the pair (R i (·, G, γ) ) i∈I is the maximal pair of correspondences with the γ-best reply property. This means there is no other pair (ς i ) i∈I with the γ-best reply property such that R i (t i , G, γ) ⊆ ς i (t i ) for each i ∈ I and t i ∈ T i , with strict inclusion for some i ∈ I and t i ∈ T i . Therefore, an action is γ-rationalizable for a type t i if and only if it is a γ-best reply to a γ-rationalizable conjecture for t i , i.e. a conjecture Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007) Finally, the following result shows that, similar to rationalizability in complete information games, interim correlated rationalizability has a characterization in terms of iterated dominance, where the notion of dominance now becomes an interim one. 
( 1) such that
The proof of this proposition, relegated to Appendix A, uses a separation argument analogous to the one establishing the equivalence between strictly dominated and never best reply strategies in complete information games. Here, too, the usefulness of the result comes from the fact that, in order to check whether an action is rationalizable for a type, we are able to reverse the order of quantifiers and seek a possibly different conjecture for each possible (mixed) deviation.
Topologies on types
The strategic topology introduced in Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) , or simply Stopology, is the coarsest topology on the universal type space T i under which the ICR correspondence is upper hemi-continuous and the strict ICR correspondence is lower hemicontinuous in all games. More explicitly, following a formulation due to Ely and Peski (2008) , the S-topology is the topology generated by the collection of all sets of the form
The S-topology on T i is metrizable by the distance d s i , defined as follows. 18 For each
17 The strategic topology can be given an equivalent definition which makes no direct reference to γ-rationalizability for γ ≠ 0. Indeed, by Ely and Peski (2008, Lemma 4) , a sub-basis of the strategic topology is the collection of all sets of the form {t i : Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) define the S-topology directly using the distance d s i , rather than using the topological definition above.
Then, for each s i and t i ∈ T
In terms of convergence of sequences, Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) show the following: For every t i ∈ T i and every sequence (t i,n ) n≥1 in T i , we have d s i (t i,n , t i ) → 0 if and only if for every game G = (A i , g i ) i∈I , action a i ∈ A i and γ ∈ R, the following upper and lower hemi-continuity properties hold: for every sequence γ n → γ,
and for some sequence γ n γ,
Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) also introduce the uniform strategic topology, or US-topology for short, which strengthens the definition of the strategic topology by requiring the convergence to be uniform over all games. More precisely, the US-topology is the topology of convergence under the metric d
This uniformity renders the US-topology particularly relevant for environments where the game-both payoffs and action sets-is not fixed a priori, such as in a mechanism design environment.
We now introduce a metric topology on types, which we call uniform weak topology, or UW-topology, under which two types of a player are close if they have similar first-order beliefs, attach similar probabilities to other players having similar first-order beliefs, and so on, where the degree of similarity is uniform over the levels of the belief hierarchy. Thus, unlike the S and US topologies, which are behavior-based, the UW-topology is a belief-based topology, i.e. a metric topology defined explicitly in terms of proximity of hierarchies of beliefs. The two main results of this section, Theorems 1 and 2 below, establish a connection between these behavior-and belief-based topologies.
Before we present the formal definition of the UW-topology, recall that for a complete separable metric space (S, d) the topology of weak convergence on ∆(S) is metrizable by the Prohorov distance ρ, defined as
where
The UW-topology is the metric topology on T i generated by the distance
where d 0 is the discrete metric on Θ, and recursively for
In the remainder of section 3 we explore the relationship between the UW-topology and the S-and US-topologies. First, we show that the UW-topology is finer than the US-topology (Theorem 1). Second, we prove a partial converse, namely that around finite types, i.e. types belonging to a finite type space, the S-topology (and hence also the US-topology) is finer than the UW-topology (Theorem 2). We conclude the section with a discussion of our results in connection with the literature.
UW-convergence implies US-convergence
Theorem 1. For each player i ∈ I and for all types
Thus the UW-topology is finer than the US-topology.
This theorem is a direct implication of the following proposition, whose proof exploits the characterization of rationalizability provided in Proposition 1.
Before presenting the proof of this proposition, it is useful to discuss its basic steps. γ-rationalizable actions of −i corresponding to the given partition cell. Now take any type s i whose k-order beliefs are δ-close to those of t i , and define a pure conjecture for s i in the same way, but according to the second partition and using a (γ + 4Mδ)-rationalizable action as the maximizer for each cell. To prove that a i is (γ + 4Mδ)-rationalizable for s i , we show that the differences in expected payoffs between a i and α i , computed for t i under the first pure conjecture and for s i under the second one, are close. We achieve this in three final steps: First, for each partition and associated pure conjecture, we order the pairs comprising states and partition cells by the payoff difference between a i and α i under the pure conjecture under consideration; accordingly, we obtain two ordered partitions of
Second, we use the induction hypothesis and the assumption that the k-order beliefs of t i and s i are close to argue that the probabilities assigned by t k i to the uppercontour sets which are measurable with respect to the first ordered partition are close to those assigned by s k i to the upper-contour sets which are measurable with respect to the second ordered partition.
19 Finally, using a summation-by-parts argument we prove that proximity of probabilities of upper-contour sets is indeed enough to guarantee that the expected payoff difference between a i and α i for s i is at least −γ − η − 4Mδ. This, again by Proposition 1, delivers the desired conclusion.
Proof of Proposition 2. Fix a game
(Note that condition (1) is trivial for k = 1.) Pick any function a −i :
and define
To conclude the proof for k = 1 we now show that θ∈Θ h(θ)s 19 An upper-contour set induced by the first (resp. second) ordered partition is a subset of Θ × T
which is measurable with respect to the first (resp. second) ordered partition and contains all pairs (θ, t k−1 −i ) for which the payoff difference between a i and α i under the first (resp. second) conjecture is greater than some value.
where the penultimate inequality follows from (4) and the last inequality from (3). Thus,
by Proposition 1, which proves the desired result for k = 1.
Proceeding by induction, we now suppose the result is valid for some k ≥ 1 and show that it remains valid for k + 1. Let s i , t i ∈ T i be such that d 
By Proposition 1 there exists a k-order (γ
Pick any measurable function a −i : 
. . ,Ā L be an enumeration of the non-empty subsets of A −i and define
as follows:
Since σ −i is a k-order γ-rationalizable conjecture for t i , we have
Likewise, define a partition {Q 1 , . . . , Q L } as follows:
Thus we have
which, together with (5) and (7), implies
Therefore, in order to prove (6) and conclude that
Indeed, to prove this inequality first note that the induction hypothesis implies
Next, let N = |Θ|L and consider an enumeration
and for all m ≠ n,
Thus, for each n = 1, . . . , N,
(by (8) and (9))
and therefore,
as required.
Corollary 1. The Borel σ -algebras of the UW-, US-, S-and product topologies coincide.
20 To see why an enumeration of Θ × {1, . . . , L} satisfying these two properties exists, note that it follows directly from the definition of
Proof. Theorem 1 implies that the Borel σ -algebra of the US-topology is contained in the Borel σ -algebra of the UW-topology. Moreover, Lemma 4 in Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) implies that the Borel σ -algebra of the strategic topology contains the product σ -algebra. Hence, it suffices to show that the product σ -algebra contains the UW-σ -algebra.
In effect, every uniform-weak ball is a countable intersection of cylinders, therefore every uniform-weak ball is product-measurable, which implies that every UW-measurable set is product measurable.
An important implication of this corollary is that the Mertens-Zamir universal type space (T i , µ i ) i∈I remains a universal type space when equipped with either of the topologies S, US or UW instead of the product topology, a fact that was not known prior to this paper.
Indeed these topologies leave the measurable structure unchanged, so µ i :
remains the unique belief-preserving mapping and a Borel isomorphism, albeit no longer a homeomorphism.
S-convergence to finite types implies UW-convergence
Here we provide a partial converse to Theorem 1. We show that, as far as convergence to finite types is concerned, convergence in the S-topology implies convergence in the UWtopology (and hence also in the US-topology).
Theorem 2. Around finite types the S-topology is finer than the UW-topology, i.e. for each player i ∈ I, finite type t i ∈ T i and δ > 0 there exists ε > 0 such that for each
This theorem is a direct implication of Proposition 3 below, which in turn relies on the following result:
Lemma 1. Let (T i ) i∈I be a finite type space. For every δ > 0 there exist ε > 0 and a game
, with A i ⊇ T i for all i ∈ I, such that for every i ∈ I and t i ∈ T i ,
and for every
The proof of this lemma, given in Appendix A, uses a "report-your-beliefs" game embedded in a "coordination" game. More precisely, we construct a game where each player being −4/δ + 1, or it assigns probability large enough to Θ × T −i , so that the conditional 
Proof. Fix a finite type space (T i ) i∈I and δ > 0. By Lemma 1 there exist ε > 0 and a game G = (A i , g i ) i∈I with A i ⊇ T i such that (10) and (11) hold for every t i ∈ T i and
, with strict inequality whenever µ ≠ µ. 22 Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) use a report-your-beliefs game to prove their Lemma 4, which states that for every k ≥ 1 and δ > 0 there exists ε > 0 such that, for all
Our assumption that t i is finite allows us to find an ε that does not depend on k, and hence obtain Theorem 2. The game we construct in Lemma 1 differs from theirs in two respects: first, Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) use a pure report-your-beliefs game, while we embed a report-your-beliefs game in a coordination game; second, in our game the players report infinite hierarchies of beliefs (albeit in a finite type space), whereas in the game of Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris's (2006) Lemma 4, players report only their k-order beliefs. then for some a i ∈ A i ,
We now show that for each i ∈ I,
For i ∈ I and t i ∈ T i consider the conjecture σ −i :
Then the action t i is a best reply to the conjecture σ −i for type t i by (10), and hence t i ∈ R i (t i , G, 0) by the characterization of ICR in terms of best reply sets, proving (13).
To prove (14) for k = 1, pick s i ∈ T i with d G, ε) . Proceeding by induction, let k ≥ 2 and assume that (14) holds for k − 1. Fix i ∈ I and t i ∈ T i and pick
It follows from (12) that
Define
By the induction hypothesis, for s i -almost every (θ, t −i ) ∈ Θ × T −i and every (θ,
where the last inequality is (15). By (12) this implies
Theorems 1 and 2 combined yield:
Corollary 2. The UW-, US-, and S-topologies are equivalent around finite types.
To end this section, we note that in Theorem 2 the assumption that t i is a finite type cannot be dispensed with. This is because the universal type space is not separable under the uniform-weak topology, whereas Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) 
Discussion

Relationship with common p-belief
As we mentioned in the introduction, the uniform-weak topology is related to the notion of common p-belief due to Monderer and Samet (1989) . Fix a state θ ∈ Θ and p ∈ [0, 1]. For
recursively for all k ≥ 2. A type t i has common p-belief in θ, and we write
A sequence of types (t i,n ) n≥1 has asymptotic common certainty of θ if for every p < 1 we have t i,n ∈ C p i (θ) for n large enough. Monderer and Samet (1989) use this notion of proximity to common certainty, i.e. common 1-belief, to study the robustness of Nash equilibrium to small amounts of incomplete information. Their main result states that for any game and any sequence of common prior type spaces, a sufficient condition for Nash equilibrium to be robust to incomplete information (relative to the given sequence of type spaces) is that, for some sequence p n 1, the prior probability of the event that the players have common p n -belief on the payoffs from the complete information game converges to 1 as n → ∞. A related paper, Kajii and Morris (1997) , shows that asymptotic common certainty is actually a necessary condition for robustness in all games. Since both results are formulated for Bayesian Nash equilibrium in common prior type spaces, to facilitate comparison with our results we report (without proof) an analogue of their results for interim correlated rationalizability and without imposing common priors:
Proposition 4. A sequence of types (t i,n ) n≥1 has asymptotic common certainty of θ if and only if for every game and every ε > 0, every action that is rationalizable for player i when θ
is common certainty remains interim correlated ε-rationalizable for type t i,n for all n large enough.
Thus the "only if" part is an interim version of Monderer and Samet (1989) and the "if" part an interim version of Kajii and Morris (1997) .
As it turns out, the uniform-weak topology can be viewed as an extension of the concept of asymptotic common certainty: these two notions of convergence coincide when the limit type has common certainty of some state. Indeed, letting t i,θ designate the type of player i who has common certainty of θ, we have: 
where the second equality follows from the induction hypothesis and the third from the
Thus, taken together, Theorems 1 and 2 extend Proposition 4 to perturbations of incomplete information models. 
Other uniform metrics
The Prohorov metric, on which the uniform-weak topology is based, is but one of many equivalent distances that metrize the topology of weak convergence of probability measures. For any such distance one can consider the associated uniform distance over hierarchies of beliefs. Interestingly, these metrics can generate different topologies over infinite hierarchies, even though the induced topologies over k-order beliefs coincide for each k ≥ 1.
Below we provide such an example. 23 Note that t i,θ is a finite type.
Given a metric space (S, d) let BL(S, d) designate the vector space of real-valued, bounded, Lipschitz continuous functions over S, endowed with the norm
Recall that the bounded Lipschitz distance over ∆(S, d) is
This distance metrizes the topology of weak convergence and it relates to the Prohorov metric ρ as follows: 25 Suppose that Θ = {θ 0 , θ 1 }, and for each n ≥ 1 consider the type space (T i,n ) i∈I where
and beliefs are as follows: 
24 See Dudley (2002) , p. 398 and p. 411. 25 The example actually shows that the two metrics are not equivalent even around complete information types. In particular, asymptotic common certainty does not guarantee convergence under β 
Since it can be shown that f This example is also relevant for the comparison between our work and Morris (2002) To reconcile these facts, we note that the notion of strict ICR correspondence implicitly used in Morris (2002) is different from the one we use, in that it does not require the slack in the incentive constraints to hold uniformly in a best reply set. Thus, for a given game, continuity of Morris's (2002) notion of strict ICR is more demanding than ours.
4 Non-genericity of finite types Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) show that finite types are dense under the S-topology, thus strengthening an early result of Mertens and Zamir (1985) that finite types are dense under the product topology. In contrast, in Theorem 3 below we show that under the US-topology finite types are nowhere dense, i.e. the closure of finite types has an empty interior. 26 An implication of this result is that the US-topology is strictly finer than the S-topology.
27
The proof of Theorem 3 relies on Lemmas 2 and 3 below. First, Lemma 2 states that finite types are not dense under the UW-topology. To prove this, we consider an instance of the countably infinite common-prior type space from Rubinstein's (1989) E-mail game and show that none of its types can be UW-approximated by a sequence of finite types.
Second, in Lemma 3 we show that any sequence of types that fails to converge to a type in the E-mail type space under the UW-topology must also fail to converge under the UStopology. Together, these lemmas imply that finite types are bounded away from the E-mail 26 This is equivalent to saying that the complement of the set of finite types contains an open and dense set under the US-topology. 27 Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006) state the result that the US-topology is strictly finer than the S-topology.
However, as reported in Chen and Xiong (2008) , the proof in that paper contains a mistake.
type space in US-distance, which we state as Proposition 6 below. This implies that the set of finite types is not dense under the US-topology. Using this result, the proof of Theorem 3
shows that every finite type can be US-approximated by a sequence of infinite types, none of which is the US-limit of a sequence of finite types, thereby establishing nowhere denseness.
In effect, consider the following instance of the E-mail type space. Let Θ = {θ 0 , θ 1 } and let the type space (U 1 , U 2 ) be thus defined:
. . ,
for every i ∈ I, finite type t i ∈ T i and n ≥ 0.
The proposition is a direct consequence of the following two lemmas:
In the proof of Lemma 2, given in Appendix A, we first show by induction that the UWdistance between any two distinct types of any player in the E-mail type space above is at least 2/3. 29 Second, we use another induction to show that any finite type t 2,n whose UWdistance from u 2,n is less than 1/3 must attach positive probability to (and hence implies the existence, in the same finite type space, of) a type t 1,n+1 whose UW-distance from u 1,n+1
is less than 1/3, which in turn implies the existence in the same finite type space of some type t 2,n+1 whose UW-distance from u 2,n+1 is less than 1/3, and so on. These two facts together imply the contradiction that the types t i,1 , t i,2 , . . . are all different but belong to the same finite type space, whence the result follows.
Turning to Lemma 3, fix an arbitrary δ ≥ 0. The proof, also in Appendix A, constructs for each N ≥ 0 a game such that for each player i and each 0 ≤ n ≤ N a certain action a i,n is rationalizable for u i,n but is not δ-rationalizable for any type t i with d
This type space is an instance of the E-mail type space where the more informed player 1 who received k messages attaches probability p = 2/3 (resp. 1 − p = 1/3) to player 2 having received k − 1 (resp. k) messages, and the less informed player 2 who received k messages attaches probability p (resp. 1 − p) to player 1 having received k (resp. k + 1) messages. Our choice that p = 2/3 is immaterial; our results hold true if we assume any other value for p. 29 The type u 1,k of player 1 who received k messages assigns probability 2/3 to the other player having received k − 1 messages, while u 1,k+1 attaches probability zero to that event, and similarly for player 2. where the order k grows with the difference N − n. To provide intuition we discuss the argument for the case N = 1. The game corresponding to this case is depicted in Figure 1 , with the payoff bound normalized to M = 4.
It is clear that in this game, for all i = 1, 2 and n = 0, 1, action a i,n is rationalizable for u i,n . 30 However, a i,n is weakly dominated by s i , and the payoffs from b i,n and c i,n are such that whenever the beliefs of a type t i are sufficiently far from those of u i,n , then any δ-rationalizable conjecture about player −i that δ-rationalize a i,n against s i cannot do so against both b i,n and c i,n as well. Indeed we have
To see this for k = 1, first note that a 1,0 is weakly dominated by s 1 , hence a 1,0 ∉ R t 2 , δ) , and the proof of (17) for k = 1 is complete. The proof for n = 0 and k = 2 uses the arguments just given for the case k = 1 and is completely analogous-for instance, those arguments show that if σ 2 is a first-order δ-rationalizable conjecture that δ-rationalizes a 1,0 for a type
and hence the distance between the second-order beliefs of t 1 and u 1,0 is at most δ.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 3. Finite types are nowhere dense under the US-and the UW-topology.
Proof. It suffices to prove that every finite type can be UW-approximated by a sequence of infinite types, none of which is the US-limit of a sequence of finite types. 31 Fix a finite type space (T 1 , T 2 ) and a type t 2 ∈ T 2 . For each n ≥ 1 let δ n = 1/(n + 1) and define the infinite type t 2,n by the requirement that, for every k ≥ 1 and every measurable E ⊆ Θ × T
Note that for all n ≥ 1, k ≥ 1 and measurable
It remains to prove that none of the types in the sequence (t 2,n ) n≥1 is in the US-closure of the set of finite types, i.e. for every n ≥ 1 there exists ε n > 0 such that the US-distance between t 2,n and every finite type in T 2 is at least ε n . Thus, fix n ≥ 1, pick any 0 < ε n < min{M/6, M/(3n + 1)}, any finite type space (S 1 , S 2 ) and any type s 2 ∈ S 2 , and let us show that d us 2 (t 2,n , s 2 ) ≥ ε n . Using Lemma 2 choose N ≥ 1 large enough so that
and let
,2 be the game defined in the proof of Lemma 3. Now define (A i,N , g i,N ) i=1,2 as follows:
and for all a 1 ∈ A 1,N , a 2 ∈ A 2,N , x ∈ {0, 1} and θ ∈ Θ, 
Note that, since all payoffs in G N are between −M and M, the same is true for all payoffs in G N . Moreover, we have the following lemma, which is proved in Appendix A.
Lemma 4. For all k ≥ 0 and all ε ≥ 0,
We now prove that (a 2 , 1)
for all a 2 ∈ A 2,N , reaching the desired conclusion that d
To show that (a 2 , 1) ∈ R 2 (t 2,n , G N , 0) for some a 2 ∈ A 2,N , it suffices to construct a rationalizable conjecture σ 1 for t 2,n in game G N under which, for all a 2 ∈ A 2,N , actions (a 2 , 0) and (a 2 , 1) give t 2,n the same expected payoff. Let σ 1 : Θ × T 1 → ∆(A 1,N ) be an arbitrary rationalizable conjecture for t 2,n in G N and define σ 1 :
From the proof of Lemma 3 it follows, using (21) with ε = 0, that σ 1 is a rationalizable conjecture for t 2,n in G N and also, using (18) and the fact that ε n < M/6, that
Thus, σ 1 (θ, t 1 )[a 1,0 ] = 0 for all θ ∈ Θ and t 1 ∈ T 1 , hence for all a 2 ∈ A 2,N we have
This proves that (a 2 , 0) and (a 2 , 1) give type t 2,n the same expected payoff under σ 1 for all a 2 ∈ A 2,N , as was to be shown.
Turning to the proof that (a 2 , 1) ∉ R 2 (s 2 , G N , ε n ) for all a 2 ∈ A 2,N , consider an arbitrary ε n -rationalizable conjecture σ 1 for s 2 in game G N . By (21) and (23), for all θ ∈ Θ and s 1 ∈ S 1 we must have
which proves that (a 2 , 1) is not ε n -rationalizable for s 2 in game G N .
A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Fix k ≥ 1 and t i ∈ T i . Let Σ −i denote the set of equivalence classes of measurable functions
where we identify pairs of functions that are equal t i -almost surely. Notice that Σ −i can be viewed as a convex subset of the real vector space L of (equivalence classes of)
Thus, f is the restriction of a bi-linear functional on R |A−| × L to the Cartesian product of the compact, convex set ∆(A i ) with the convex set Σ −i (not topologized). By a minmax theorem of Fan (1953) we obtain 
and also 
Now define the payoff function g i : Θ × A i × A −i → R, as follows:
It follows directly from the definition of g i and the fact that t i [
yields an expected payoff of F i (a i , t i ) to type t i under the conjecture σ −i :
Fix any 0 < ε < min{η(1 − δ/2), δ/2}. We shall prove (11) now. Fix t i ∈ T i and ψ ∈ ∆(Θ × A −i ), and assume that there exists
we have
which proves (11) for the case ψ[
which proves (11) also for the case
Finally, to ensure that the payoffs are bounded by M, multiply g i and ε by a factor of Mδ/4, if necessary. This normalization does not affect the validity of (11).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
First we prove by induction that
For all n ≥ 1 we have u
The proof of (25) is complete. Now let (T 1 , T 2 ) be a finite type space and for every i = 1, 2 and every n ≥ 0 define and hence, as before, t 2,n θ 1 × T 1,n+1 ≥ t 2,n θ 1 × t 1 ∈ T 1 : d uw 1 (t 1 , u 1,n+1 ) < δ ≥ 1/3 − δ > 0, so T 1,n+1 ≠ ∅. Similarly, we can show that T 1,n ≠ ∅ implies T 2,n ≠ ∅ for all n ≥ 1.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
For any given N ≥ 1 we construct a game G N with action sets 
and moreover, for every δ ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ k ≤ N, a 1,n ∈ R 2(k+1) 1
Indeed, this implies the statement of the lemma.
Fix N ≥ 1. For convenience, throughout the proof let a 1,N+1 = s 1 and θ n = θ 1 for every n ≥ 2. The payoffs in G N are as follows. Actions s 1 and s 2 give constant payoffs:
g 1,N θ, s 1 , a 2 = g 2,N θ, a 1 , s 2 = 0 for every θ ∈ Θ, a 1 ∈ A 1,N , and a 2 ∈ A 2,N .
Actions a 1,0 , . . . , a 1,N and a 2,0 , . . . , a 2,N are weakly dominated by s 1 and s 2 , respectively: To prove our first claim, namely that (28) is valid for k = 0, fix any t 2 ∈ T 2 and 0 ≤ n ≤ N, assume that a 2,n ∈ R 1 2 (t 2 , G N , δ), and let σ 1 : Θ × T 1 → ∆(A 1,N ) be a corresponding 0-order δ-rationalizable conjecture. Since a 2,n is a δ-best reply to σ 1 , the difference in expected payoff when choosing s 2 instead of a 2,n under σ 1 must be at most δ, hence Pr θ n , a 1,n t 2 , σ 1 + Pr θ 1 , a 1,n+1 t 2 , σ 1 ≥ 1 − δ/M.
as required by (27) when n > 0.
There remains to prove our third claim. Assuming (27) for some 0 ≤ k < N, we must show that (28) remains valid when k is replaced by k + 1. Pick any t 2 ∈ T 2 and 0 ≤ n ≤ N − k − 1, assume that a 2,n ∈ R 2(k+1)+1 2 (t 2 , G N , δ) and let σ 1 : Θ × T 1 → ∆ (A 1,N ) be a corresponding 2(k + 1)-order δ-rationalizable conjecture. Since a 2,n is a δ-best reply to σ 1 , the difference in expected payoff when choosing s 2 or b 2,n or c 2,n instead of a 2,n under σ 1 must be at most δ. Thus, as before, (29) and (30) 
A.5 Proof of Lemma 4
Fix ε ≥ 0 and note that (21) and (22) are trivially true for k = 0. Now we assume they are true for some k ≥ 0 and prove that they hold for k + 1. Note that since (22) holds for k, there exists a mapping ξ : T 2 × A 2,N → {0, 1} satisfying a 2 , ξ(t 2 , a 2 ) ∈ R k 2 (t 2 , G N , ε) ∀t 2 ∈ T 2 , ∀a 2 ∈ R k 2 (t 2 , G N , 2ε).
Let us prove (21) for k + 1 now. Fix any t 1 ∈ T 1 and a 1 ∈ R k+1 1 (t 1 , G N , 2ε) and let σ 2 : Θ × T 2 → ∆(A 2,N ) be a corresponding k-order 2ε-rationalizable conjecture. Define the conjecture σ 2 : Θ × T 2 → ∆(A 2,N ) for game G N as follows:
σ 2 (θ, t 2 ) a 2 , ξ(t 2 , a 2 ) = σ 2 (θ, t 2 )[a 2 ] ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀t 2 ∈ T 2 , ∀a 2 ∈ A 2,N .
By (34), σ 2 is a k-order ε-rationalizable conjecture for t 1 . Moreover, the difference in expected payoff for t 1 between any a 1 ∈ A 1,N and a 1 under σ 2 in game G N is (t 2 , G N , 2ε), so the proof of (22) for k + 1 is complete.
